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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Inequality and Stability in Democratic and Decentralized Indonesia 
Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin (Western Sydney University, Australia), Athia Yumna (The SMERU Research Institute), 
Sarah E. Gultom (Monash University, Malaysia), M. Fajar Rakhmadi (The SMERU Research Institute), M. Firman Hidayat 
(The Ministry of National Development Planning (Bappenas), and Asep Suryahadi (The SMERU Research Institute) 
 
 
Economic inequality in Indonesia has been on the rise and recently reached a record high level of 
0.41 measured by the Gini index of household consumption expenditure. Aside from economic 
implications, the issue of rising inequality is also socially and politically important as it may harm 
societal stability, especially in a large, diverse and young democracy plagued by widespread 
poverty and vulnerability amid rising expectations. This study finds empirical support for the 
violence-increasing effects of higher inequality across districts in provinces previously considered 
as ‘high conflict’ regions. The result is robust after controlling for province and time effects, 
ethnic and religious fractionalizations and series of usual determinants of violence, as well as 
across different measures of violence. This new evidence implies that it is important to include 
measures to tackle inequality as an explicit focus in the development agenda. 
 
 
Keywords: inequality and stability, inequality and violence, district panel, crime in Indonesia 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In recent years, rising income inequality has become increasingly a global concern. In the last two 
decades, income inequality has risen in the majority of advanced economies and some large 
developing countries. Domestic inequality of disposable income increased in 65 out of 130 
countries for which data is available, and these countries are home to more than two thirds of the 
world’s population (UN, 2013). The US economy, which was the epicentre of the two major global 
economic crises over the past century (the Great Depression, starting in 1929, and the Global 
Financial Crisis starting in 2007), experienced a sharp increase in income and wealth inequality 
leading up to these two events (Kumhof and Rancière, 2010; Rajan, 2010).  
 
Rising inequality, more specifically between the richest 1%and the remaining 99%, and corporate 
greed are at the heart of the Occupy Wall Street movement which started in the United States 
and spread to other developed economies (Dube and Kaplan, 2012).  More recently, Pope Francis 
stated that “inequality is the root of social evil” (Christian, 2014) and Barack Obama labeled 
income inequality as the “defining challenge of our times” (Newell, 2013). Piketty (2014) argued 
that rising inequality is embedded in the capitalist economic system because returns to capital 
have been increasingly higher than the overall economic growth rate since the middle of the last 
century.  
 
Indonesia shares a similar concern, as income inequality has been on the rise, especially after 
the late 1990s economic crisis and subsequent reforms. Concerns with the overall (vertical) 
inequality in Indonesia, so far, is primarily driven by the evolution of Gini coefficient of per 
capita household expenditure derived from the National Socioeconomic Survey (Susenas). It has 
been said that during the period of the “East Asian miracle” before the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis (AFC), the Indonesian economy did not follow  Kuznets’ (1955) prediction of a trade-off 
between income and equality in the early stages of development. Three decades of sustained 
high growth was achieved while maintaining a relatively constant overall inequality level, as 
measured by the Gini coefficient of household expenditure (around 0.33) (World Bank, 1993).  
 
However, the story is different in post-crisis Indonesia. While the economy recovered fairly 
quickly from the AFC and the growth has been assessed to be quite robust amid the recent global 
financial crisis (GFC), overall inequality has increased. The expenditure Gini ratio reached a record 
high at 0.41 in 2011 and 2012, surpassing the warning level of 0.4 for the first time.1 Since 2011, 
Indonesia could be categorized as a country with low income and high inequality, moving away 
from the low income and low inequality situation of a decade earlier (Yusuf, 2014).  
 
A cautionary approach should be adopted when using the Susenas-based expenditure Gini 
coefficient in gauging the magnitude of economic inequality in Indonesia both during the ‘miracle’ 
New Order economy as well as during the recent period of rising inequality. It has been argued 
that the Susenas expenditure Gini tends to seriously underestimate the true level of economic 
inequality. The reason for this are firstly conceptual, but also technical.  
 
                                                 
1
A Gini coefficient of 0.4 is considered as the international warning level for dangerous levels of inequality. This is a 
widely cited reference when China published its Gini index in early 2013 for the first time in 12 years, see for example, 
‘China’s ‘Above Warning Level’ Income Gap Shows Inequality’ (http://www.globaltimes.cn/ content/756786. 
shtml) and ‘Gini Coefficient Release Highlights China's Resolve to Bridge Wealth Gap’ (http://news.xinhuanet.com/ 
english/china/ 2013-01/21/c_132116852.htm). 
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On a conceptual level, when using the Gini index of consumption expenditure, it should be 
remembered that consumption is clearly different from income, let alone wealth or assets. 
Consumption expenditure only represents part of income earned in a typical household; it has a 
smoothing effect through savings and withdrawal. In the longer term, income is accumulated in 
the form of wealth or assets that grow through capital gains or investment returns. Therefore, by 
definition, expenditure inequality is lower than income inequality, and income inequality should 
be less than wealth inequality.2 Economic inequality could refer to any of these inequalities, 
whether consumption, income or wealth.  
 
On technical grounds, the sampling nature of the Susenas tends to fail to capture the 
consumption of the very high and very low income groups; it can be difficult to make contact with 
these groups, and the data collected may not reflect actual consumption patterns (Yusuf, 2006). 
Therefore, if Indonesia is concerned with the recent rise in expenditure Gini beyond the warning 
level, one can only imagine the true magnitude of economic inequality based on income or wealth 
measures.  
 
There are at least two potential effects of inequality that are well-reported in existing literature. 
First relates to the effect on economic performance or prosperity; and second is how it affects 
societal stability. Both effects are important and they also influence one another. On the one 
hand, an equitable and sustainable rise in prosperity is needed for societal stability; on the other 
hand, stability could be seen a prerequisite for that kind of prosperity. This paper is aimed at 
examining the possible effects of inequality on societal stability based on recent socioeconomic 
data in democratic and decentralized Indonesia, which refers to the period after the rather 
chaotic transition of late 1990s and early 2000s.  
 
This study has three main findings. First, it finds a violence increasing effect of vertical inequality 
that helps in explaining the bell-shaped curve relationship between violence and income. This is 
done by treating vertical inequality endogenous to income following the Kuznets curve. These 
findings, in particular, bring together coherent three way relationships of the three variables: 
inequality, income, and violence. The effect of inequality on violence is much stronger and more 
consistent than the role of variables belonging to the opportunity hypothesis such as growth, 
poverty, education, and demography.  
 
Second, at a macro level, it highlights a changing nature of collective violence in Indonesia from 
the dominance of large scale episodic violence during the transition to the dominance of small 
scale routine violence in post-2005 Indonesia. Closely related to the second finding, the third is 
about the characteristics of post-2005 ethnic violence that show a close resemblance with that of 
routine violence. This is in contrast to the episodic nature of ethnic violence during the 
democratic transition. This finding is supported by the fact that the three way relationships of 
vertical inequality, income, and violence are not only found in the cases of routine violence and 
violent crime, but also valid for the case of ethnic violence. The shift from episodic to routine 
                                                 
2
The following bears testimony to the presence of a tiny, but very wealthy elite in Indonesia. In 1996 the top ten super-
rich Indonesian families controlled 57.7 per cent of stock market capitalization in the country; this is the highest 
proportion in East Asia (Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 1999). In 2011, although Indonesia’s richest 43,000 citizens 
represented less than one hundredth of 1% of the population, their total wealth accounted for 25% of the country’s 
GDP; the average wealth of the 40 richest Indonesians is the highest in the region and their combined wealth is equal to 
10.2 per cent of the country’s GDP (Winters, 2013). Furthermore, the fragility of the Indonesian economy in the wake of 
the Asian financial crisis and its subsequent democratic transition indicate that the level of economic inequality in 
Indonesia had not been low and stable as was commonly perceived (Thee, 2002; UNSFIR, 2003; Dhanani, Islam, and 
Chowdhury, 2009; Frankema and Mark, 2009). The long-term data (1971–2008) indicates that only a minority share of 
income (less than 30%) accrued to labor, while the majority belongs to capital; and the proportions have not changed 
much over the period (Tadjoeddin, 2013b). 
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violence and the changing nature of ethnic violence point to a process of normalization of 
collective violence as the effect of the transition shock has largely disappeared since 2005, when 
the country reached the new equilibrium of social contract in the form of democratic and 
decentralized Indonesia (Tadjoeddin, 2014).   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the notion of societal stability as 
our main concern. Section III traces earlier literature to locate inequality in the process of 
development and probes its potential links with societal stability. Section IV offers a brief 
overview of inequality and conflict. Our empirical estimation strategy is detailed in section V, 
while results are presented in Section VI. A brief conclusion is offered in the last section.  
 
 
 
II. WHY STABILITY AND WHAT DO WE MEAN 
BY IT 
 
 
The importance of societal stability for ethnically diverse Indonesia, with a population of 250 
million people cannot be overlooked. The country is a young democracy and the third largest in 
the world. After being upgraded by the World Bank to the status of a lower-middle income 
country, more recently Indonesia was upgraded to the 10th largest economy in the world by virtue 
of recent purchasing power parity (PPP) data (Jakarta Post, 2014). The country’s transition to 
democracy took place amid a serious economic decline in the wake of the late 1990s AFC.  
 
The transition is, however, regarded as by some as a risky exercise as some authors argue that 
there is a minimum threshold of income at which democracy can be successful (Przeworksi et al., 
2000; Zakaria, 2003). Although democracy is seen as a nonviolent mechanism for conflict 
resolution, the practice of democracy in low and lower-middle income countries is often 
complicated by violence, even civil war. The risks of violent conflict during democratic transitions 
in lower income countries have been strongly attested to, and empirically supported (Hegre et al., 
2001; Snyder, 2000). Based on anecdotal evidence, several influential commentators have also 
suggested that democratization in developing countries produces poor economic outcomes, 
political instability, and ethnic conflict (Kaplan, 2000; Chua, 2002; and Zakaria, 2003).  
 
To a large extent, the Indonesian experience very much concurs with the above assessment as the 
country’s move toward democracy was accompanied by a significant eruption of violent conflict. 
In fact, the surge in various kinds of violence during the initial phase of transition led some 
observers to portray Indonesia as a potential Balkan of Southeast Asia, in reference to the risk of 
disintegration that the country faced (Booth, 1999; Cribb, 1999).   
 
Violent conflict, or group and collective violence in contemporary Indonesia could be broadly 
categorized into episodic and routine events (Tadjoeddin and Murshed, 2007; Tadjoeddin 2014). 
The former consists of separatist and ethnic violence, and the latter centers on group brawls and 
vigilante violence. While episodic violence is typically associated with a high number of deaths 
and a relatively low number of incidents, the routine variety is characterized by the converse. 
Between 1990–2003, ethno-communal violence accounted for 89% of total deaths (9,612 
fatalities) in cases cases of nonseparatist collective violence, but it contributed only 17% of total 
incidents; routine violence accounted for 11% of deaths but 83% of total incidents (Varshney, 
Tadjoeddin, and Panggabean, 2008).  
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Separatist violence was confined to Aceh, Papua, and East Timor before its official independence 
from Indonesia. Episodic violence has had a major economic impact and displaced many people,3 
while routine violence tends to cause minor damage and is less likely to displace inhabitants. 
Interestingly, during the peak of the transition, while routine violence occured in almost all areas 
of Java, episodic violence was concentrated in a few regions in the outer islands.  
 
A surge in separatist and ethnic violence marked the Indonesian transition to democracy. Soon 
after the fall of Suharto, the new generation of Free Aceh Movement (GAM) rebels, energized by 
new Libyan-trained recruits, launched a fresh challenge to the Indonesian grip on the Aceh 
Province. A similar story of a significantly renewed secessionist challenge launched by the Free 
Papua Organization (OPM) also occurred in Papua in the eastern end of the country. The renewed 
secessionist challenges were not only articulated militarily (GAM in Aceh and OPM in Papua); they 
were also complemented with political moves among civil society organizations, as represented 
by the Information Center for Referendum in Aceh (SIRA) and the Presidium of Papua Council 
(PDP) in Papua.  
 
Secessionist political movements, complemented by organized rebel wings, were clearly present 
in Aceh and Papua, and they are categorized as having high and medium levels of separatist 
violence respectively. The secessionist civil war in Aceh was ended by the 2005 Helsinki Peace 
Agreement 2005 which offered self-governance for the region, while the separatist violence in 
Papua has declined significantly since the granting of special autonomy status to the region in 
2001. The GAM rebel military organization in Aceh has been transformed into several local 
political parties that now participate in local democratic processes. In fact, the provincial 
government has been run by the former rebels since 2007. In Papua, elements of the separatist 
movement have also been largely absorbed into local political and economic processes under the 
cloak of decentralization and local democracy.  
 
Inter-ethnic violence rampaged through Maluku, Poso, Sambas, Sampit, and several other 
locations with a clear pattern of regional concentration, and mainly occurred in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s during the peak of democratic and decentralization reforms. Ethnic violence occurs 
among communal groups clearly divided along ethnic lines. Following Horowitz (1985), “ethnic” is 
broadly defined as ascriptive (birth based) group identities: race, language, religion, tribe, or caste 
can become the basis of ethnic identities. 
 
The construction of systematic data on collective violence in Indonesia was pioneered by the 
UNDP-sponsored UN Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery (UNSFIR) (Tadjoeddin, 2002; 
Varshney, Tadjoeddin, and Panggaben, 2008). Later, the World Bank expanded and deepened the 
UNSFIR collective violence database through the ViCIS project (Barron et al. 2009). The World 
Bank collective violence database has been adopted into the Indonesian National Violence 
Monitoring System4 (SNPK). The SNPK is officially housed at the Coordinating Ministry for People’s 
Welfare and receives technical support from the Habibie Centre and the World Bank. The SNPK 
collects data on incidents of collective violence and violent conflict, as well as violent crime.  
 
Looking at the data, there is a clear shift in the pattern of collective violence away from separatist 
and ethnic violence (as found during the peak of democratic transition in late 1990s and early 
2000s) towards the dominance of routine violence in the post-transition period.  Figures 1 and 2 
                                                 
3
In 2001 during the peak of violent conflicts in Indonesia, it was reported that violent incidents had created 1.3 million 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) spread across 22 provinces throughout the country (The Jakarta Post, 20 November 
2001).  
4
See www.snpk-indonesia.com for further information about the database and its content. 
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present the aggregate trends of collective violence during 2005–2012, the period after major 
episodes of separatist and ethnic violence during the peak of the transition had been largely 
resolved.5 The data is for regions previously considered as “high conflict” during the peak of the 
transition, including Aceh, Lampung, Jakarta, and some districts (kabupaten) in West Java (Bogor, 
Depok, and Bekasi), Banten (Tangerang), West Nusa Tenggara (NTB), East Nusa Tenggara (NTT), 
West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, Maluku (including North Maluku) and 
Papua (including West Papua). From both measures, fatalities, and total incidents, routine 
violence has been by far the most dominant form of collective violence since 2005. 
 
 
Figure 1. Incidents of collective violence in previously “high conflict” regions,  
2005–2012 
Source: Calculated from SNPK data. 
 
 
Figure 2. Death due to collective violence in previously “high conflict” regions,  
2005–2012 
Source: Calculated from the SNPK data. 
 
                                                 
5
See Varshney, Tadjoeddin, and Panggabean (2008) for patterns of collective violence during democratic transition in 
Indonesia.   
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The nonepisodic nature of routine violence during 2005–2012 can be seen from tables 1 and 2. 
Incidents of routine violence and related fatalities are spread over the years without any clear 
pattern of regional concentration, which is in contrast to separatist and ethnic violence during the 
peak of the transition. Furthermore, a closer look at the aggregate time series data of incidents 
and damaged caused (deaths, injuries, and damaged buildings) shows increasing trends of routine 
and ethnic violence in recent years, particularly during 2009–2012, as depicted in figures 3 and 4. 
The increasing trend of ethnic violence is more pronouced, which is quite worrying. However, it 
has to be noted that the magnitude of ethnic violence is far lower than that of routine violence, a 
comparison depicted earlier in figures 1 and 2.  
 
Table 1. Deaths in Routine Violence, 2005–2012 
Region 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Aceh 4 2 2 14 6 6 14 11 
Lampung 22 19 17 25 27 28 26 25 
Jabodetabek
a
 78 72 30 47 32 41 58 78 
West Nusa Tenggara 17 12 17 14 23 12 15 20 
East Nusa Tenggara 19 14 10 9 12 10 21 18 
West Kalimantan 3 3 2 2 7 7 5 3 
Central Kalimantan 2 7 3 8 5 2 7 5 
Central Sulawesi    10 8 7 2 2 11 7 11 
Maluku 11 3 7 22 4 7 12 36 
Papua 15 16 12 13 32 17 44 41 
Total 181 156 107 156 150 141 209 248 
Source: Calculated from the SNPK data. 
a
Greater Jakarta (Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi). 
 
Table 2. Incidence of Routine Violence, 2005–2012 
Region 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Aceh 30 87 148 227 278 212 216 392 
Lampung 196 214 150 175 201 167 175 161 
Jabodetabek
a
 939 763 627 492 568 487 631 716 
West Nusa Tenggara 201 189 183 195 162 221 170 247 
East Nusa Tenggara 140 109 100 132 111 116 127 134 
West Kalimantan 239 227 193 166 201 135 91 95 
Central Kalimantan 42 58 61 81 74 59 91 86 
Central Sulawesi    83 96 98 90 69 98 113 146 
Maluku 124 94 131 214 165 214 194 280 
Papua 178 134 152 220 243 243 281 376 
Total 2172 1971 1843 1992 2072 1952 2089 2633 
Source: Calculated from the SNPK data. 
a
Greater Jakarta (Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi). 
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Incidents Deaths 
 
Injuries Buildings damaged 
 
Figure 3. Routine violence: incidents and damage caused, 2005–2012 
Source: Calculated from the SNPK data. 
 
Incidents  Deaths  
 
Injuries Buildings damaged 
 
Figure 4. Ethnic violence, incidents, and damage caused, 2005–2012 
Source: Calculated from the SNPK data.  
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Societal stability could be understood as harmony in societal relations. However, this is an 
abstract desirable outcome that cannot be easily represented by a single indicator, let alone 
directly measured. In the interest of practicality, it will be easier to focus on variables that may 
harm societal stability. In this regard, two variables are important: violent conflict and violent 
crime. For violent conflict, this study concentrates on routine violence during 2005–2012 in 
regions previously considered as “high conflict” provinces, due to the changing pattern of 
collective violence in Indonesia explained earlier.    
 
 
 
III. INEQUALITY IN DEVELOPMENT  
 
 
Economic inequality within a society is essentially a by-product of the development process. 
Therefore, the presence of inequality has long been regarded as a natural phenomenon. 
Suppressing the level of inequality to zero is a utopian ideal and has been proven to be a failed 
experiment, as evident in economically communist China and the former Soviet Union. The 
challenge lies in keeping an eye on the level of inequality and maintaining it at a tolerable level.  
 
There is a long list of literature on inequality in development. However, Albert Hirschman, Arthur 
Lewis, and Simon Kuznets are among the pioneers (Hirschman, 1973; Lewis, 1976; Kuznets, 1955). 
Lewis (1976) stressed the inevitable presence of inequality during the development process, and 
famously contended that development must be inegalitarian because “it does not start in every 
part of the economy at the same time” (26).  
 
Much earlier than that, Kuznets (1955) argued that a trade-off inevitably occurs between income 
and inequality in the early stage of development, before an economy eventually achieves higher 
levels of income and reduced inequality. Kuznets’ analysis of the evolution of inequality—taking 
the shape of an inverted-U with regard to income level—is based on the sectoral transition of 
workers from (traditional) agriculture to (modern) industry. This process implies that: (i) the surge 
in inequality is temporary and will eventually decline as income progresses; (ii) the higher 
inequality in the middle part of the inverted-U curve, representing the transitional period from 
agriculture to industry is driven by income differences between the agricultural and industry 
sectors; (iii) the levels of inequality within both the agricultural and industrial sectors are lower 
than the overall inequality when the two sectors are combined. 
 
The concept of tolerance for economic inequality, introduced by Hirschman (1973), expands the 
discussion on inequality in development to include societal stability. If this tolerance exceeded, 
hope will transform into grievance. Hirschman (1973) explained the notion of tolerance for 
economic inequality through the idea of a “tunnel effect”. The tunnel illustration is originated 
from Hirschman’s explanatory analogy with traffic in a two-lane tunnel traffic jam. The traffic jam 
is confined to one lane but is stirred into hope by movement in the second lane; eventually some 
drivers will illegally cross into that lane, if it seems that the traffic jam appears to be clearing 
there. In this illustration, the “tolerance limit” is the maximum duration of how long drivers in the 
first lane remain patient before they start to illegally cross lanes.  
 
Hirschman identified a social mechanism that contains the sense of relative deprivation or envy 
that emerges due to a rise in inequality. As development proceeds, some people’s fortunes 
improve and others are left behind, and thus inequality typically increases. But rather than being 
plagued by anger, this may instead lift the expectations of those left behind. Greater inequality 
communicates information about social and economic advancement that could be interpreted as 
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a source of hope even for those not immediately benefiting from development. However, hope 
will be replaced by grievance if the tolerance reaches its limit, and such grievances may endanger 
societal stability. 
 
Inequality relates to other economic, political, and social issues. Rising inequalities have 
challenged the notion of the trickle-down effect of economic growth advanced by mainstream 
economics. High levels of inequality can be a serious obstacle to future economic growth and a 
potential cause of underdevelopment (Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer, 2012; Easterly, 2007). 
Poverty reduction is undermined by rising inequality (Ravallion, 2011). Inequality is also found to 
positively correlate with current account deficits and household debts (Goda, 2013; Kumhof and 
Rancière, 2010; UNCTAD, 2012); both are sources of macroeconomic instability. Rising inequality 
undermines democracy (Stiglitz, 2012) and is a primary source of many social ills (Wilkinson and 
Pickett, 2009). More importantly, and related to the focus of this study, rising inequality has also 
been associated with violent conflict; this is the issue, in turn, discussed below.     
 
 
 
IV. INEQUALITY AND CONFLICT  
 
 
An important dimension in the analysis of violent conflict is the perceived and actual equitability 
of distribution of the fruits of economic progress among the population. In short, income 
inequality does matter. There are two types of inequality, vertical and horizontal. Vertical 
inequality refers to inequality in a general population and is commonly measured by the Gini 
coefficient.6 Horizontal inequality refers to inequality between different ethno-social groups or 
regions. It can be measured simply by the ratio of mean or average incomes of two groups (or 
regions). It can also be measured by the relative size of different groups’ (or regions’) share of 
total income—Gross National Income (GNI), group Gini coefficients or by a metric akin to the 
coefficient of variation. Horizontal inequality thus shows the relative welfare of different 
socioeconomic or ethno-religious groups or regions. Horizontal inequality generates a sense of 
relative group deprivation, while vertical inequality causes a general sense of personal deprivation 
among the poor and lower-middle income groups. 
 
The link between inequality and conflict is an age-old concern. Many theorists have suggested 
that the former breeds the latter, for example Gurr (1970), Huntington (1968), and Russett 
(1964).7 Cramer (2005: 1) argues, “it is almost a universal assumption that an inequitable 
distribution of resources and wealth will provoke violent rebellion.” Kanbur (2007:5) states that 
“it seems to be generally accepted that poverty and inequality breed conflict.” In general, 
inequality creates a sense of injustice that is central to the grievance behind any kind of violent 
conflict. Nafziger, Wayne, and Auvinen (2002) find that large income inequality exacerbates the 
vulnerability of populations to humanitarian emergencies.  
 
                                                 
6
Another widely used measure is the decile dispersion ratio, which presents the ratio of the average consumption or 
income of the richest 10% of the population divided by the average income of the bottom 10%. It indicates how the 
bottom decile of the population (in terms of income) fairs in comparison with the top decile. 
7
Since Aristotle, social philosophers have speculated that economic inequality is a fundamental cause of political 
violence and revolution. De Tocqueville ([1835] 1961:302) stated the classical hypothesis succinctly: “Almost all of the 
revolutions which have changed the aspect of nations have been made to consolidate or to destroy social inequality. 
Remove the secondary causes which have produced the great convulsions of the world, and you will almost always find 
the principle of inequality at the bottom”. 
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Muller (1997: 137) argued that “a high level of income inequality radicalizes the working class, 
enhances class polarization, and reduces the tolerance of the bourgeoisie for political 
participation by the lower classes.” In a cross-country study, he showed a positive correlation 
between income inequality and binary variable of stability and instability of democracy between 
1960 and 1980. These studies support the work of Alesina and Perotti (1996) who found that 
income inequality was associated with social discontent and political instability, which in turn are 
correlated with lower investment. 
 
However, the two most widely cited cross-country empirical studies on civil war by Fearon and 
Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) have largely dismissed the role of inequality in 
conflict. From a political science perspective, Fearon and Laitin imply that inequality does not 
matter because of state capacity, referring to the suppressive power of the state. The Collier and 
Hoeffler view is more akin to banditry or warlordism. For them, the root cause of conflict is not 
social pathology, such as inequality, but individual pathology like greed. They also ignore the issue 
of collective action, as discussed in Olson (1965), because political scientists are too often 
analytically blinded by the concept of power, while neo-classical economists are primarily 
concerned with selfish motivations. 
 
Since these studies (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) use the Gini index of 
vertical income inequality that measures inequality between individuals for the entire country, its 
differentiation between this and horizontal inequality, which focuses on inequality between 
groups, becomes critical. In this regard, Stewart (2000, 2008) argues that it is the latter (horizontal 
inequality) that matters for conflict. Groups’ horizontal inequalities help in building in-group 
solidarity and, in turn, solve develop a basis for collective action. Stewart presents several case 
studies in support of her argument. Following Stewart’s work, an emphasis on horizontal 
inequality has also received empirical support in a recent cross-country study of civil war 
(Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug, 2013; Østby, 2008), as well as in ethnic conflict across districts 
in Indonesia (Mancini, Stewart, and Brown, 2008).  
 
Horizontal inequality between different regional and ethnic groups played a significant role in 
separatist and ethnic conflicts in Indonesia (Tadjoeddin, 2011; 2013a). In contrast to Stewart 
(2000, 2008),  Tadjoeddin argued that it is not the widening of horizontal inequalities that 
matters, but the convergence of socioeconomic progresses across regions and between ethnic 
groups achieved during Suharto’s New Order authoritarian setting, which have led to a sense of 
relative deprivation among the previously richer and more influential groups.  
 
Inter-ethnic conflict arising from a narrowing of horizontal inequality or converging gap between 
two competing ethnic groups is not unique to Indonesia. It is also the case in India, where Hindu 
populations are the traditionally privileged group and Muslims are a relatively disadvantaged 
group. Mitra and Ray (2013) find that an increase in Muslim well-being, proxied by Muslim per-
capita expenditures, leads to a significant increase in future Hindu-Muslim violence, while an 
increase in Hindu well-being has no significant effect on future conflict. They interpret this as a 
product of Hindus acting as the aggressor against the marginalized group (Muslims) who are 
trying to catch up.  
 
In the case of convergence, we may see that the traditionally privileged groups may act as the 
aggressor. On the other hand, in the case of divergence, the marginalized group becomes the 
aggressor, as in the case of the 1969 race riot in Malaysia when marginalized and poorer Malays 
attacked the wealthier Chinese. The marginalized may also become aggressors in the case of 
vertical inequality. 
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Another strand of research relates the role of vertical inequality in conflict related to 
democratization movements. For example, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) believe that the 
demand for democracy is partly driven by aspirations for redistribution. In most cases, the 
democratization movements in thier early phases have involved violent actions against 
authoritarian regimes. The violence involves not only the citizens and the security apparatus, but 
also the beneficiaries of the system (the elites and their private armies) and the general public.   
 
Therefore, it would be unwise to totally discount the role of vertical inequality in conflict and 
solely focus on horizontal inequality, as the latest research developments seem to suggest, see for 
example Stewart (2008) and Østby et al. (2011). Both types of inequality create a sense of 
frustration that is essential in fuelling grievances among the general population and 
socioeconomic and ethno-religious groups. It is argued that the opposing findings may be due to 
differences in the type of conflict considered. While the studies do not consider vertical inequality 
central to high profile violent conflicts such as civil war and ethnic conflict, a recent study by 
Tadjoeddin et al. (2012) finds that vertical inequality has a violence-increasing effect in the case of 
low-profile, routine violence in the densely populated and ethnically rather homogenous island of 
Java. In the case of routine violence, a general sense of deprivation among the population due to 
high inequality of income and assets may play a significant role. Routine violence in one sense is a 
manifestation of frustration, and can be seen as a competition among the lower strata of the 
socioeconomic class in the absence of a class war. 
 
Therefore, recent studies on collective violence in contemporary Indonesia have helped to clarify 
the different roles of the two types of inequality (horizontal and vertical) within the two broad 
classifications of collective violence, episodic and routine. Based on the changing nature of 
collective violence in Indonesia discussed earlier, our empirical examination will focus on routine 
violence as the most dominant type of collective violence since 2005. In addition, we also examine 
ethnic violence as it shows an increasing trend, although its magnitude is much smaller than that 
of routine violence. It has to be noted that the characteristics of post-2005 ethnic violence show 
close resemblance to that of routine violence.   
 
 
 
V. EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION STRATEGY  
 
 
This study is an empirical examination of the link between inequality and societal stability. 
Stability is proxied by two variables: collective violence and violent crime. Collective violence data 
is taken from the SNPK dataset.8 In addition to collective violence, the SNPK also collects violent 
crime statistics. As explained earlier, the SNPK has its origin in the World Bank’s efforts in 
deepening and expanding of the previous UNSFIR collective violence database. In constructing the 
database, the SNPK gathers information from local newspapers, complemented by NGO reports 
and other reputable sources. Each entry provides information on the date, location, and impact of 
the event; classifications of type, form and trigger of violence; actor affiliation, and intervention. 
The SNPK is an ongoing effort. The SNPK data dates back to 1997, but the area coverage varies 
(see Table 3).  
                                                 
8
See Barron, Jaffrey, and Varshney (2014) for a detail discussion about the SNPK dataset and how it was constructed. 
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Table 3. SNPK Area Coverage 
Regions 
Year 
1997-2004 2005-11 2012-13 
Aceh v v v 
Lampung - v v 
Jabodetabek
a
 - v v 
West Nusa Tenggara  - v v 
East Nusa Tenggara  v v v 
West Kalimantan  v v v 
Central Kalimantan  v v v 
East Kalimantan  - - v 
Central Sulawesi v v v 
Maluku v v v 
North Maluku  v v v 
Papua v v v 
West Papua v v v 
Source: SNPK. 
a
Greater Jakarta (Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi). 
 
Given the SNPK area coverage, for consistency, this study focuses on the period 2005–2012 for 
the following regions: (i) Aceh, (ii) Lampung, (iii) Jabodetabek, (iv) West Nusa Tenggara, (v) East 
Nusa Tenggara  (vi) West Kalimantan, (vii) Central Kalimantan, (viii) Central Sulawesi, (ix) Maluku, 
(x) North Maluku, (xi) Papua, and (xii) West Papua. We use district level data to trace patterns 
back to 2000, before the start of the decentralization, meaning that we merge all new districts 
with their parent districts in 2000. Therefore we have panel data observations in the form of 
district-year.  
 
The period 2005–2012 is chosen to achieve consistent coverage using SNPK data and represents a 
period when the episodic violence seen at the peak of democratic transition had been more or 
less settled. By 2005 the macro picture of Indonesian decentralization had reached a fairly stable 
shape. The decentralization laws initially introduced in 1999 (to take effect in 2001) were revised 
in 2004. The revision included the adoption of direct elections for heads of local government. 
Special autonomy arrangements in the previously restive regions of Aceh and Papua were 
confirmed.  
 
Ethnic violence in several regions in the outer islands including Maluku, Sambas, Sampit, and Poso 
during the peak of decentralization reform has been labelled as communal war by Klinken (2007), 
while the more sporadic incidents of ethnic violence occuring after 2005 are rather different. The 
former reflects uncertainties during democratic and decentralization reforms, while the latter 
(post-2005 ethnic violence) is related more to problems stemming from the the residual illiberal 
characteristics of Indonesia’s democracy due to incompleteness of the reform (Wilson, 2015).  
 
Our main variables of interest are collective violence or violent crime as the inverse measures of 
societal stability, treated as dependent variables; and inequality as our main independent 
variable. The relationship is written as follows: 
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VIO represents an inverse measure of societal stability that includes routine violence, ethnic 
violence and violent crime. Routine and ethnic violence includes incidents and fatalities, while for 
violent crime we only consider the number of incidents. INEQ is the inequality variable. We 
consider both types of inequality, vertical and horizontal; the former is relevant for routine 
violence and violent crime, and the latter is more suitable to explain ethnic violence. The Gini 
index of consumption expenditure, based on Susenas data, is used as the vertical inequality 
measure, while group Gini (GGINI) and weighted group coefficient of variation (wGCOV) of years 
of schooling (education) across ethnic and religious groups, (based on the decadal population 
census), are used as the horizontal inequality measures.9   
 
For the independent variables, in addition to the INEQ variable, we include X vector, representing 
a series of potential determinants of violence, as controls. They include economic growth, income 
(per capita regional gross domestic product—RGDP), poverty rate (percentage of population living 
below the poverty line), education (years of schooling), young (proportion of young population 
aged 15–24), urban (share of urban village in a district), ethnic/religious fractionalization and 
population size.  
 
The inclusion of most of the independent variables is based on the opportunity/feasibility 
hypothesis on violence (Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner, 2009). Economic growth indicates recent 
and current economic situations that reflect hope for continuous increases in the income levels in 
the long run; therefore, growth should be negatively associated with violence (Tadjoeddin and 
Murshed, 2007). Level of income reflects the overall level of development. Both lower growth and 
income indicate lower opportunity costs to engage in violence for participants.  There is a 
consensus that per capita GDP is the most robust predictor of civil war risk, and it is almost always 
included in any cross country conflict regression (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006; Ross, 2004). Fearon 
and Laitin (2003) use per capita GDP as a proxy for state strength, arguing that state weakness, 
such as limited policing capacity and poor infrastructure, provides the opportunity for rebels to 
sustain insurgency. 
 
The logic of poverty as a determinant of violence is also closely linked to the opportunity 
hypothesis. However, different to lower average incomes, poverty measures are concerned with 
the relative size of the population living below a certain income threshold. Poverty was found be 
positively correlated with routine violence across districts in Java during 1993–2003 (Tadjoeddin 
and Murshed, 2007) and local electoral violence across districts in Indonesia during 2005–2007 
(Tadjoedin, 2011). Education is another variable to gauge level of development, where a lower 
level of education is associated with lower opportunity cost to engage in violence (Østby and 
Urdal, 2010).  
 
We also consider several demographic variables. The proportion of young people aged between 
15 and 24, popularly referred to  as youth bulge,  is another control variable since the majority of 
participants in violent events are youths (Urdal, 2006, 2008).  Then, we include an urban variable 
referring to the share of villages in a district classified as urban. A higher proportion of urban 
villages implies a higher population density; this indicates population pressure, making violence 
more likely (Ostby et al., 2011; Urdal, 2012). Next, ethnic and religious fractionalizations are 
control variables that account for grievances based on identity frames (Esteban, Mayoral and Ray, 
2012). The last variable is population size, which serves purely as a control variable. We do not 
convert the dependent variables, either incident or fatality measures, into incident or death per 
                                                 
9
See Mancini, Stewart, and Brown (2008) for a detailed formula for GGINI and wGCOV.  
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population in order to retain the original nature of our dependent variable as count data. This 
enables us to consistently use count data regression, negative binomial, to estimate the model.10  
 
Data on vertical inequality (Gini index of consumption expenditure), years of schooling and 
proportion of young people are calculated from Susenas. Growth and per capita RGDP (Regional 
Gross Domestic Product) are derived from the 2010 Regional Income Account. Data on horizontal 
inequalities and fractionalization are calculated from the population census. All of this data is 
collected by Statistics Indonesia (BPS).  
 
 
 
VI. RESULTS 
 
 
This section details our results, presented in the order of our dependent variables (routine 
violence, ethnic violence, and violent crime). A robustness check is offered in the final part of this 
section. 
 
 
6.1 Routine Violence  
 
We begin with routine violence, the dominant type of collective violence since 2005. Vertical 
inequality is found to be positively correlated with incidents of routine violence (Table 4, Columns 
3 and 4). The statistically significant and sizable magnitude of the Gini variable is obtained after 
treating inequality as endogenous to the level of income, following Kuznets’ bell-shaped curve 
relationship between inequality and income (Kuznets, 1955). A Kuznets-type relationship between 
inequality and income in Indonesia has also been confirmed by a recent cross district panel study 
(Tadjoeddin, 2013c).   
 
The positive and highly significant coefficients of income in Columns (1) and (2) are against our 
initial expectation, as studies show that that level of income is the most robust predictor of 
conflict (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). We check a quadratic (bell-shaped curve) relationship 
between violence and income and found that the quadratic relationship is highly significant. This 
is to reconcile the contrasting views about the linear and nonlinear relationships between 
violence and income, as detailed in Tadjoeddin and Murshed (2007).  An increase in prosperity 
may encourage predatory behavior in the form of private violence (akin to our concept of routine 
violence) stemming from grievances among the less fortunate or the greed of the more fortunate. 
Once growth progresses further, violence has to decline to sustain security of investment, and the 
state has to perform a regulatory function. If everyone’s prosperity is lifted up to a certain level, 
they would be less envious and less prone to routine violence. 
 
These two key findings, the violence-increasing effect of inequality and the bell-shape relationship 
between violence and income, are obtained after controlling for province and time-fixed effects, 
ethnic and religious fractionalization, and a series of usual suspected variables found to contribute 
to violence in the opportunity hypothesis. The three way relationship among the three variables—
inequality (Gini), income, and routine violence—are summarized in Figure 5. These results 
                                                 
10
The basic model for estimating count data is the Poisson regression model for rare events. However, the Poisson 
model usually suffers from the problem of over-dispersion. In this case, a popular alternative is the negative binomial 
regression. See Cameron and Trivedi (1998) for more details on count data regressions that are common in certain 
types of empirical research, such as criminology. 
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reaffirm the findings of previous studies by Tadjoeddin and Murshed (2007) and Tadjoeddin, 
Chowdhury, and Murshed (2012) on routine violence across districts in the Indonesian island of 
Java during 1993–2003.  
 
Compared with the two previous studies that focused on districts in West, Central, and East Java 
and covering mainly the democratic transition period, the current study makes several 
improvements. First, its unit of analysis is across district in regions previously categorized as high 
conflict regions during the transition. However, the period of analysis is during 2005–2012, after 
uncertainties related to the democratic transition had been largely settled. This, in particular, 
relates to the changing nature of collective violence from the episodic one in pre-2005 to the 
routine one in post-2005. Second, it controls for time and province fixed effects simultaneously 
and a series of usual determinants of violence under the opportunity hypothesis.  
 
Table 4. Vertical Inequality and Routine Violence  
(Negative Binomial Regressions) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gini 0.634 0.682     
Predicted_Gini   15.7*** 15.4***   
Percapita RGDP .021*** .021***   .048*** .047*** 
Percapita RGDP_squared     -2.3e-04*** -2.2e-04*** 
Fractionalization_ethnic -.594*  -.569*  -.585*  
Fractionalization_religion  0.613  0.565  0.495 
Growth of RGDP -0.563 -0.681 -0.56 -0.674 -0.547 -0.667 
Poverty -.021** -.019* -.02** -.019* -.021** -.019* 
Years of schooling .11* 0.101 .105* 0.097 0.091 0.085 
Young population (15-24) 2.24 2.09 2.24 2.11 2.51 2.41 
Urban dummy .958* 0.778 0.861 0.694 .905* 0.737 
Population (million) .576*** .596*** .44*** .462*** .543*** .561*** 
Constant 0.56 0.484 -3.44* -3.42* 0.665 0.569 
Province_fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year_fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Over-dispersions -.699*** -.683*** -.66*** -.646*** -.714*** -.697*** 
Observations  664 664 664 664 664 664 
Note: Significant at: *10, * *5, * * *1 percent levels; regressions are with robust standard errors clustered at district level; 
the variable of “predicted_Gini” is derived from the Kuznets-type relationship between inequality and income, controlled 
for province and time-fixed effects. 
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Figure 5. Vertical inequality (Gini), income, and violence 
 
Several important results from the control variables should also be highlighted. The variable of 
economic growth consistently turns up negative, albeit insignificant, which is still in accordance 
with the opportunity-for-violence hypothesis. Slower growth indicates a lower opportunity cost to 
engage in violence for its participants. The series of demographic variables are also in line with the 
opportunity hypothesis. Levels of violence tend to be higher in districts with higher population 
density and a larger proportion of young people. However, the negative and significant 
coefficients of the poverty variable across the six models are against our expectation.    
 
 
6.2 Violent Crime 
 
Now, let us consider violent crime for which data is made available by the SNPK. Our hypothesis 
on the relationship between inequality and violent crime is similar to that on routine violence as 
the two have a close resemblance. Although routine violence must contain a criminal dimension, 
it cannot simply be labelled as crime since its collective nature points to a deeper social context. 
In essence, violent crime is more confined to rather individualistic criminal behaviors and its social 
context is weaker than that of routine violence. In relation to routine violence, we find a 
statistically significant crime-increasing effect of higher vertical inequality, and a bell-shape 
relationship between crime and income (Table 5). Our finding on the positive effect of inequality 
on crime is consistent with the findings of two recent studies in Colombia and Mexico (Poveda, 
2011; Enamorado, et al. 2014). 
 
The results of other control variables are also strongly supportive of the opportunity hypothesis. A 
higher incidence of violent crime is more likely to be experienced by districts with slower 
economic growth, a higher poverty rate, and a larger youth population. The significant and 
positive effect of education on violent crime should be interpreted with caution. We suspect the 
relationship is in the form of bell-shape curve as in the case of income. Therefore, as in the case of 
income, in the long-run, achieving a higher level of education should correlate with a lower 
frequency of violent crime.11 However, as in the case of routine violence, the negative and 
significant coefficients of the poverty variable are against our expectation.  
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This is an interesting avenue for further research, but beyond the scope of the current study.  
Gini Violence Violence
Income Income Gini
A: Kuznets (1955) B: Tadjoeddin & Murshed (2007) C: Tadjoeddin et al. (2012)
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Table 5. Vertical Inequality and Violent Crime (Negative Binomial Regressions)  
Dep. Var: incidents of violent crime 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gini 0.878 0.703     
Predicted_Gini   29.7*** 27.4***   
Percapita RGDP .025*** .022***   .074*** .069***   
Percapita RGDP_squared     -4.5e-04*** -4.1e-04*** 
Fractionalization_ethnic -0.177  -0.222  -0.207  
Fractionalization_religion  -1.62***  -1.58***  -1.53*** 
Growth of RGDP -1.34*** -1.21*** -1.42*** -1.29*** -1.42*** -1.3*** 
Poverty -.025** -.018* -.026** -.019* -.026** -.02** 
Years of schooling .183*** .202*** .164*** .187*** .153*** .175*** 
Young population (15-24) 3.51** 3.97** 3.8** 4.18** 4.04** 4.4*** 
Urban 0.672 0.762 0.488 0.581 0.537 0.622 
Population (million) .698*** .646*** .549*** .517*** .625*** .586*** 
Constant 0.152 -0.328 -7.76*** -7.67*** 0.277 -0.228 
Province_fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year_fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Over-dispersions -.757*** -.812*** -.776*** -.827*** -.804*** -.854*** 
Observations  664 664 664 664 664 664 
Note: Significant at: *10, * *5, * * *1 percent levels; regressions are with robust standard errors clustered at district level; the 
variable “predicted_Gini” is derived from the Kuznets-type relationship between inequality and income, controlled for 
province and time-fixed effects. 
 
Our findings on the positive effect of vertical inequality on routine violence and violent crime are 
largely consistent. Furthermore, the coefficients of the vertical inequality variable appear to be 
more consistent and more significant compared with the series of control variables across several 
alternative regression models. This indicates the superiority of an inequality variable in explaining 
violence and crime. Therefore, a key policy message that can be drawn from this finding is that 
rising inequality is bad for societal stability. The next section examines the role of inequality in 
ethnic violence.         
 
 
6.3 Ethnic Violence  
 
Previous studies have linked ethnic violence with horizontal inequality, but not vertical inequality 
as the latter is more relevant to routine violence, as explained earlier (Otsby et al., 2011; 
Tadjoeddin, Chowdhury, and Murshed, 2012).12 In this section we examine the effect of both 
vertical as well as horizontal inequality on ethnic violence. We start with vertical inequality. To the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first examination of the link between vertical inequality and 
ethnic violence in Indonesia.  
 
                                                 
12
Fjelde and Østby (2012) examined horizontal inequality and communal conflict across regions (subnational units) in 
Africa and found that regions with strong horizontal economic inequalities have a significantly higher risk of 
experiencing intergroup conflict. 
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The previous two key findings on routine violence, namely (i) the violence-increasing effect of 
vertical inequality, and (ii) the bell-shape relationship between violence and income, are also 
found to be relevant in the case of ethnic violence (Table 5).  These results are found after 
controlling for province and time-fixed effects, ethnic and religious fractionalization, and a series 
of potentials for violence as per the opportunity hypothesis. This finding is interesting as it points 
to the fact that post-2005 ethnic violence in Indonesia has characteristics similar to routine 
violence, while ethnic violence during the democratic transition of late 1990s was clearly episodic. 
In contrast to routine violence, the opportunity hypothesis also seems to be less relevant in the 
case of ethnic violence, where only the urban variable turns up significant.   
 
The effects of horizontal inequality on ethnic violence presented in Table 7 appear to be stronger 
than that of vertical inequality presented in Table 6. This is because the effect of horizontal 
inequality on ethnic violence is a direct one, while the effect of vertical inequality (Gini) is through 
the predicted value of Gini derived from a Kuznets regression.   
 
In summary, this exercise has established the relevance of both vertical as well as horizontal 
inequalities in the case of post-2005 ethnic violence in Indonesia. As expected, however, the 
predictive power of horizontal inequality is stronger than that of vertical inequality in explaining 
ethnic violence. The relevance of vertical inequality in explaining ethnic violence is something new 
and this reminds us of the changing characteristics of recent incidents of ethnic violence as they 
have come to more closely resemble those of routine violence, in terms of not demonstrating 
clear regional and timing concentrations.  
 
Table 6. Vertical Inequality and Ethnic Violence (Negative Binomial Regressions) 
Dep. Var: incidents of ethnic violence 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gini 1.19 1.63     
Predicted_Gini   26.6** 29.7**   
Percapita RGDP .029*** .032***   .073*** .081*** 
Percapita RGDP_squared     -3.7e-04* -4.2e-04** 
Fractionalization_ethnic -1.71**  -1.64**  -1.55**  
Fractionalization_religion  2.94**  2.86*  2.73* 
Growth of RGDP -1.69 -2.18 -1.41 -1.84 -1.34 -1.75 
Poverty 0.019 0.014 0.016 0.01 0.018 0.013 
Years of schooling 0.041 0.017 -4.80E-03 -0.037 -2.20E-03 -0.031 
Young population (15-24) -2.67 -3.24 -2.46 -2.91 -2.29 -2.73 
Urban 1.6** 0.942 1.46** 0.85 1.49** 0.898 
Population (million) .925*** 1.11*** .687*** .835*** .869*** 1.03*** 
Constant -1.91 -1.84 -8.31** -8.91** -1.57 -1.38 
Province_fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year_fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Over-dispersions .944*** .95*** .949*** .95*** .927*** .927*** 
Observations  664 664 664 664 664 664 
Note: Significant at: *10, * *5, * * *1 percent levels; regressions are with robust standard errors clustered at district level; the 
variable of “predicted_Gini” is derived from the Kuznets type relationship between inequality and income, controlled for 
province and time fixed effects. 
   19 The SMERU Research Institute 
Table 7. Horizontal Inequality and Ethnic Violence (Negative Binomial Regressions)  
Dep. Var: incidents of ethnic violence 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
HI (w_GCOV_ethnic) 3.87***    
HI (w_GCOV_religion)  6.81***   
HI (GGINI_ethnic)   5.53*  
HI (GGINI_religion)    17.5***   
Fractionalization_ethnic -1.92**  -2.08**  
Fractionalization_religion  2.43*  1.16 
Percapita RGDP .07*** 0.038 .077*** 0.033 
Percapita RGDP_squared -3.6e-04* -1.30E-04 -4.0e-04** -2.00E-04 
Growth of RGDP -1.32 -0.822 -1.36  
Poverty 7.60E-04 -6.40E-03 8.50E-03  
Years of schooling 0.103 0.193 0.046  
Young population (15-24) -3.42 -1.57 -3.06  
Urban 0.992 -0.093 1.3*  
Population (million) .823*** .958*** .848***  
Constant -1.7 -3.06* -1.44 -1.54***   
Province_fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
Year_fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
Over-dispersions .863*** .782*** .902*** .859*** 
Observations  664 664 664 664 
Note: Significant at: *10, * *5, * * *1 percent levels; regressions are with robust standard errors clustered 
at district level. 
 
 
6.4 Robustness Checks 
 
As explained earlier, our findings on the violence-increasing effect of higher inequality hold after 
controlling for both province and year-fixed effects. The inclusion of province effects means that 
the regression has controlled for province-specific, time-invariant unobserved characteristics. 
Year effects control for time-variant unobserved characteristics not unique to any particular 
region, such as national election years and external shocks due to the global financial crisis (GFC).  
The model has also included several other variables usually suspected to have links with violence, 
based on the opportunity hypothesis. 
 
While we rely on the incident measure of violence, we check the stability of our key findings by 
employing a fatality measure of routine and ethnic violence (see appendices 1, 2, and 3). Our key 
findings hold using the death measure after controlling for province and year-fixed effects, 
ethnic and religious fractionalization, and a series of other potential determinants of violence.  
 
Another potential problem with our model is a possible reverse causality (endogeneity) between 
violence and inequality. While we consider the effect of inequality on violence, on the other 
direction, violence could have an impact on income distribution as only a small section of the 
society would usually be affected by physical destruction due to violence. This argument is likely 
to be true in the case of large scale incidents of episodic violence as experienced by Indonesia 
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during the democratic transition. However, we argue that this is an unlikely scenario in the case of 
small scale incidents of routine violence and the more routine kind of ethnic violence in post-2005 
Indonesia, where small scale violent incidents would unlikely to have serious impacts on income 
distribution. To anticipate this concern, however, we run the key regressions with lag 
independent variables and our key finding hold (see appendices 4, 5, and 6).   
 
 
 
VII. CONCLUSION  
 
 
This study has located the problem of economic inequality in the development process and 
hypothesized that the violence-increasing effects of inequality may harm societal stability. 
Societal stability is something that cannot be overlooked in a large and diverse country like 
Indonesia with its young democracy. It has also been established that alternate types of inequality 
may differently affect each type of collective violence; therefore, unpacking inequality and 
violence into several categories is critical.   
 
The empirical results have provided strong support for the hypothesis contending that rising 
inequality is harmful for societal stability based on data on routine violence, ethnic violence, and 
violent crime in several Indonesian provinces previously categorized as “high conflict” regions. 
The inequality variable appears to be more significant and consistent as a determinant of 
collective violence compared with a series of variables representing the opportunity for violence 
hypothesis.  These findings are based on empirical analysis of data for the period 2005–2012. This 
period was comparatively much more stable in terms of democratization and decentralization, if 
one compares the situation with that of the late 1990s and early 2000s.  
 
As Indonesia aspires to continuously grow, achieve a higher level of development, become a more 
significant regional player and, more importantly, to further consolidate its democracy, something 
must be done to tackle rising inequality. This new evidence implies that continuously increasing 
inequality is indeed something to be worried about. Therefore, as an initial measure we have to 
ensure that tackling inequality is included as an explicit focus in the development agenda. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Table A1. Vertical Inequality and Routine Violence (Death Measure) 
Dep. Var: deaths of routine violence 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gini -1.15 -0.926     
Predicted_Gini   10.1* 12*   
Percapita RGDP .011** .012**   .03** .035** 
Percapita RGDP_squared     -1.60E-04 -1.9e-04* 
Fractionalization_ethnic -.781*  -.718*  -.703*  
Fractionalization_religion  0.294  0.174  0.11 
Growth of RGDP -0.55 -0.738 -0.556 -0.725 -0.567 -0.736 
Poverty -2.60E-03 4.50E-05 -3.10E-03 -5.30E-04 -3.10E-03 -4.10E-04 
Years of schooling -0.04 -0.049 -0.048 -0.057 -0.054 -0.063 
Young population (15-24) -0.863 -0.835 -1.03 -0.899 -0.83 -0.667 
Urban 0.172 -5.30E-03 0.039 -0.129 0.055 -0.106 
Population (million) .609*** .639*** .539*** .562*** .591*** .615*** 
Constant 0.556 0.273 -2.34 -3.09* 0.272 -7.40E-03 
Province_fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year_fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Over-dispersions -.333* -.31* -.331* -.312* -.343* -.325*  
Observations  664 664 664 664 664 664 
Note: Significant at: *10, * *5, * * *1 percent levels; regressions are with robust standard errors clustered at district level; the 
variable of “predicted_Gini” is derived from the Kuznets type relationship between inequality and income, controlled for 
province and time fixed effects. 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Table A2. Vertical Inequality and Ethnic Violence (Death Measure) 
Dep. Var: deaths of ethnic violence 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gini 3.16 3.49     
Predicted_Gini   14.6 33**   
Percapita RGDP -0.01 0.012   0.047 .097** 
Percapita RGDP_squared     -5.80E-04 -9.4e-04** 
Fractionalization_ethnic -3.34**  -2.83*  -2.91*  
Fractionalization_religion  -1.68  -1.86  -1.92 
Growth of RGDP -7.3*** -8.61*** -6.69*** -7.45*** -6.69*** -7.43*** 
Poverty 0.109 .099* .112* .105* .11* .105* 
Years of schooling 0.12 0.236 0.032 0.092 0.024 0.083 
Young population (15-24) -4.4 -2.86 -2.92 -1.07 -3.21 -1.28 
Urban 2.81 1.02 2.86 1.26 2.82 1.2 
Population (million) 1.68** 2.15* 1.75** 1.94** 1.54* 1.75* 
Constant -6.69* -8.62** -9.92* -16.3*** -5.83* -7.46** 
Province_fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year_fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Over-dispersions 2.55*** 2.57*** 2.55*** 2.56*** 2.55*** 2.55***  
Observations  664 664 664 664 664 664 
Note: Significant at: *10, * *5, * * *1 percent levels; regressions are with robust standard errors clustered at district level; the 
variable of “predicted_Gini” is derived from the Kuznets type relationship between inequality and income, controlled for 
province and time fixed effects. 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Table A3. Horizontal Inequality and Ethnic Violence (Death Measure) 
Dep. Var: deaths of ethnic violence 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
HI (w_GCOV_ethnic) 9.95***    
HI (w_GCOV_religion)  17.7***   
HI (GGINI_ethnic)   20.3***  
HI (GGINI_religion)    49.2*** 
Fractionalization_ethnic -4.14**  -4.89***  
Fractionalization_religion  -4.31  -7.47** 
Percapita RGDP 0.05 0.029 0.077 -0.048 
Percapita RGDP_squared -5.80E-04 -4.80E-04 -7.7e-04* 6.80E-05 
Growth of RGDP -6.23*** -4.14** -6.55*** -1.96 
Poverty 0.053 0.064 0.06 0.088 
Years of schooling 0.218 .705** 0.144 .467** 
Young population (15-24) -11.1 2.53 -11.2 -2.06 
Urban 2.2 -1.47 2.61 0.561 
Population (million) 1.88E+00 1.6 1.92* 1.59* 
Constant -3.6 -13.1*** -2.92 -9.39*** 
Province_fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
Year_fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
Over-dispersions 2.46*** 2.35*** 2.48*** 2.36*** 
Observations  664 664 664 664 
Note: Significant at: *10, * *5, * * *1 levels; regressions are with robust standard errors clustered at 
district level.  
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Table A4. Vertical Inequality and Routine Violence (Lag Independent Variables) 
Dep. Var: incidents of routine violence 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gini       
Predicted_Gini   12.1** 10.9**   
Percapita RGDP     .039*** .036*** 
Percapita RGDP_squared     -1.8e-04** -1.6e-04** 
Fractionalization_ethnic   -0.16  -0.15  
Fractionalization_religion    1.38  1.28 
Growth of RGDP   -1.02*** -1.1*** -1.04*** -1.12*** 
Poverty   -0.016 -0.017 -0.016 -0.017 
Years of schooling   .09* 0.072 0.08 0.064 
Young population (15-24)   2.29 2.01 2.65 2.37 
Urban   0.549 0.452 0.545 0.454 
Population (million)   3.4e-07*** 3.6e-07*** 4.1e-07*** 4.3e-07*** 
Constant   -2.33 -1.81 1.14 1.27 
Province_fixed effect   yes yes yes yes 
Year_fixed effect   yes yes yes yes 
Over-dispersions   -.479*** -.501*** -.513*** -.533*** 
Observations    663 663 663 663 
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Table A5. Vertical Inequality and Ethnic Violence (Lag Independent Variables) 
Dep. Var: incidents of ethnic violence 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gini       
Predicted_Gini   32.7** 35.2**   
Percapita RGDP     .1*** .105*** 
Percapita RGDP_squared     -6.4e-04*** -6.8e-04*** 
Fractionalization_ethnic   -1.34*  -1.21*  
Fractionalization_religion    3.02**  2.9* 
Growth of RGDP   -1.38*** -1.55*** -1.55*** -1.71*** 
Poverty   1.10E-04 -1.50E-03 1.30E-03 -2.50E-04 
Years of schooling   -0.104 -0.125 -0.102 -0.119 
Young population (15-24)   1.39 0.817 1.55 0.993 
Urban   0.467 3.70E-03 0.403 -0.031 
Population (million)   4.3e-07*** 5.6e-07*** 5.4e-07*** 6.6e-07*** 
Constant   -11.2** -12** -1.71 -1.77 
Province_fixed effect   yes yes yes yes 
Year_fixed effect   yes yes yes yes 
Over-dispersions   .993*** .952*** .964*** .924*** 
Observations    663 663 663 663 
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Table A6. Vertical Inequality and Violent Crime (Lag Independent Variables) 
Dep. Var: incidents of violent crime 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gini       
Predicted_Gini   14.4*** 12.6***   
Percapita RGDP     .049*** .045*** 
Percapita RGDP_squared     -2.8e-04*** -2.6e-04*** 
Fractionalization_ethnic   0.078  0.066  
Fractionalization_religion    1.92*  1.84* 
Growth of RGDP   -1.29*** -1.32*** -1.31*** -1.34*** 
Poverty   -.022** -.023** -.022** -.023** 
Years of schooling   .128** .114** .115** .103** 
Young population (15-24)   3.46** 3.12** 3.81** 3.46** 
Urban   0.359 0.239 0.339 0.22 
Population (million)   4.4e-07*** 4.5e-07*** 4.8e-07*** 4.9e-07*** 
Constant   -2.73* -1.98 1.46** 1.64** 
Province_fixed effect   yes yes yes yes 
Year_fixed effect   yes yes yes yes 
Over-dispersions   -.479*** -.517*** -.502*** -.538*** 
Observations    663 663 663 663 
 
   
 
Telephone : +62 21 3193 6336 
Fax      :  +62 21 3193 0850 
E-mail   :  smeru@smeru.or.id 
Website :  www. smeru. or.id 
Facebook : The SMERU Research Institute 
Twitter : @SMERUInstitute 
YouTube : SMERU Research Institute 
Scan Here 
